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 Charges, denials, and countercharges of “bigotry” have a long history in debates over the 
evident conflict between LGBT rights and religious liberty.1 In recent controversies, a frequent 
claim is that religious individuals who oppose changes in the legal definition of civil marriage and 
seek conscience-based exemptions from state nondiscrimination laws that include “sexual 
orientation” as a protected category are being “branded” as bigots. Two prominent examples are 
the dissenting opinions in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 in which the United States Supreme Court held 
that same-sex couples “may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States,” and the 
arguments made in defense of merchants who object to providing wedding-related goods and 
services to same-sex couples, such as in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, which the  Supreme Court will decide during its 2017-2018 term. Critics of the 
application of nondiscrimination laws to such merchants even flip the (explicit or implicit) charge 
of bigotry to apply to the opponents of religious exemptions. 
 
 What does it mean to assert that a judicial opinion or a civil rights commission tars 
someone with the “brush of bigotry”?3 Is a charge of bigotry inferred simply from asserting that 
society should learn from the past: that now-repudiated forms of discrimination – on the basis of 
race and sex – are relevant to protecting against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? 
Or from comparing past religious defenses of segregation and bans on interracial marriage with 
religious justifications for opposing marriage by same-sex couples? Are these analogies inapt 
because today’s sincere religious believers have nothing in common with yesterday’s 
segregationists? Indeed, does the label “bigot” better apply to public officials who show 
“intolerance” toward today’s sincere believers by refusing them exemptions from 
                                                 
* This is a draft chapter for the edited volume,  RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS 
FOR COMMON GROUND (William S. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin F. Wilson, eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 
2018). Portions of this Chapter draw from my forthcoming book, BIGOTRY, CONSCIENCE, AND MARRIAGE: PAST 
AND PRESENT CONTROVERSIES (under contract with Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2019), and are used with 
permission of the publisher.  
1See, e.g., William Raspberry, Anita Bryant and Gay Rights: Bigotry or Prudence?, WASH. POST, May 2, 
1977.  
2 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
3 U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (critiquing Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion for lacking evidence to attribute “sinister motive” for the Defense of Marriage Act and “tar the 
political branches with the brush of bigotry”);   USCCB Religious Liberty Chairman Responds to Statement of 
Chairman of U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, (Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.usccb.org/news/2016/16-117.cfm 
(quoting Archbishop Lori describing statements by Martin Castro, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights, as “reckless and painting those who support religious freedom with the broad brush of bigotry”). See also 
Lori, this volume, for view that “[t]hose who are convinced that marriage is between one man and one woman 
should not be equated with racial bigots). 




nondiscrimination laws, driving from the public square?4 
 
 These controversies reveal a number of puzzles. One puzzle is whether bigotry has to do 
with the motivation for a belief – is sincerity a defense to bigotry? The frequent contrast between 
the “sincere” opponent of same-sex marriage and the “racist bigot” of the past suggests the answer 
is yes. Common definitions of bigotry, however, suggest the answer may be no. If the core of 
bigotry concerns intolerance and prejudice toward another group’s beliefs or a group itself, then a 
sincere white supremacist or anti-Semite or anti-Muslim could still be bigoted.5 
 
 Another puzzle concerns whether bigotry refers primarily to the content of a belief, that is, 
an unreasonable belief or an irrational hatred or suspicion of a group,6 so that reasonableness of 
a belief would counter a charge of bigotry. Or does “bigot” suggest a particular type of (bad) 
character of the person holding the view, with distinctive psychological or moral traits — holding 
views about a group inflexibly and obstinately, impervious to facts?7 Or does the label “bigotry” 
signal an anachronistic and now-reviled view? On this definition, calling a position bigoted 
declares that it is (no longer) within the boundaries of civility and not an acceptable basis for 
supporting or opposing laws. 
 
 As a window into these puzzles, this Chapter assesses the rhetoric of “bigotry” and 
“conscience” in two contexts: (1) the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES,8 and (2) 
arguments made by the parties and amici curiae in Masterpiece Cakeshop. These contexts reveal 
a set of contrasting positions. First, defenders of religious liberty argue that to relate present-day 
objections based on conscience and sincerely-held religious beliefs about marriage—and related 
arguments that those objections warrant exemptions from nondiscrimination laws—to past 
assertions of religious liberty in the context of objecting to complying with civil rights laws 
prohibiting race discrimination brands people – indeed, slanders them – as bigots. Today’s sincere 
Christian (or Jew or Muslim) declining to create a wedding cake or otherwise affirm same-sex 
marriage is nothing like the racist (past or present) refusing to serve all Black customers.  And, 
some add, is nothing like the homophobe refusing to serve any gay or lesbian customers. Instead, 
people of faith have championed civil rights and justice.  
 
                                                 
4See Stephen Smith, Who’s on Which Side of the Lunch Counter? Civil Rights, Religious Accommodation, 
and the Challenges of Diversity, PUBLIC DISCOURSE, Dec. 2, 2016.  
5See Bigotry, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictory.com/bigotry (collecting several definitions 
mentioning “prejudice,” “intolerance,” and “obtuse or narrow-minded intolerance, especially of other races or 
religions”). 
6See id. (quoting The American Heritage Roget’s Thesaurus defining “bigotry” as “irrational suspicion of a 
particular group, race, or religion”).  
7See, e.g., Gordon W. Allport, The Bigot in Our Midst, XL THE COMMONWEAL 582, 583 (Oct. 6, 1944) (the 
“mental dynamics of bigotry” include the inability to take another’s perspective or correct one’s misinterpretations 
based on new information about a group); STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER, THE BIGOT: WHY PREJUDICE PERSISTS 7 (2014) 
(“[t]he bigot’s prejudices rest on pre-reflective assumptions that become fixed, finished, and irreversible in the face 
of new knowledge”).  
8 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: RECONCILING NONDISCRIMINATION 




Those defending the extension of nondiscrimination laws to protect LGBT persons counter 
that history teaches lessons about past assertions of conscience and religious liberty, which were 
used to justify many forms of discrimination and exclusion. While courts themselves, for a time, 
accepted – and voiced – such religious justifications, courts have, for many decades, upheld 
nondiscrimination laws against such challenges. This past counsels caution about arguments that 
“free exercise” entails living out one’s faith in the public square even when that includes denying 
customers goods and services. Further, the framing of “religious liberty v. LGBT rights” obscures 
the fact that religious traditions differ in their views and also evolve, sometimes spurred by legal 
change.9 
 
 Second, both contexts reveal competing views of the legitimate scope of modern public 
accommodations laws. Invoking Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale, defenders of exemptions contend that the clash between religious liberty and LGBT rights 
stems from the (unwarranted) expansion of public accommodations laws beyond core (compelling) 
interests—e.g., racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, gas stations, and entertainment 
venues—to cover more places and more categories, such as sexual orientation and gender 
identity.10 Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, on this view, is the paradigm of a justified civil 
rights law.11  
 
Defenders of state public accommodations laws counter that the expansion of such laws 
reflects evolving understanding of the problems of prejudice and discrimination. While Title II is 
a landmark law, many states passed public accommodations laws long before Congress did, and 
expanded them in light of new insights and learning.12 Apt here is Justice Stevens’ statement, in 
his Dale dissent, that “every state law prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice 
with principle.”13  
  
 Third, both sides agree on the importance of civility, tolerance, and pluralism, but disagree 
about what those commitments require. Supporters of people “of conscience” trying to “live out 
their faith” in the marketplace argue that robust protection of First Amendment freedoms 
everywhere – including the public square – is the only path to tolerance, civility, and peaceful 
coexistence. Defenders of full enforcement of modern civil rights law argue that civility and 
tolerance require that there be limits to acting on beliefs – however sincere and religiously-
motivated – in businesses open to the public; that is the “price of citizenship” that we pay in our 
“civic life.”14 In a religiously diverse nation, unless certain lines are drawn, every conscience 
would be “‘a law unto itself,’” raising “the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civil obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”15 
                                                 
9 For calls for internal reexamination, see Gramick, this volume. 
10Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 664 (2000).  
11 42 USCA § 2000a.  For discussions of Title II’s scope, see Laycock, this volume; Wilson, this volume. 
12 For a chronology of state public accommodations laws extending to sexual orientation and gender 
identity, see Wilson, this volume. 
13Dale, 530 U.S. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
14See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 79-80 (N.M. 2013) (Bosson, J., concurring). 
15 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (sustaining, against a Free Exercise challenge, 





 This Chapter, focuses primarily on the first set of contrasting arguments, since they most 
directly engage the rhetoric of “bigotry” and “conscience.”16 It argues that the charge leveled by 
proponents of robust exemptions that people are being “branded as bigots” for their beliefs is often 
needless and provocative when directed at explanations about the constitutional limits of using 
religious and moral beliefs as a basis for (1) excluding others from a constitutional right or (2) 
denying them the protection of civil rights law. The mere step of drawing analogies between past 
and present forms of discrimination to point out how evolving understandings lead to recognition 
that such treatment lacks justification is not – in itself – a charge of “bigotry.” On the other hand, 
it is often needless and provocative for opponents of exemptions to indict religious belief as a 
“pretext” or “code word” for discrimination in order to justify limits to acting on such beliefs in 
the marketplace.17 This Chapter concludes with a brief comment on the oral argument in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop. During the argument, the parties and the justices debated the relevance of 
analogies to past civil rights battles and the Court’s prior rulings upholding nondiscrimination 
laws. Also at issue was what the rhetoric of Obergefell implied about the requirements of civility 
and tolerance. 
II. The United States Supreme Court’s Rhetoric 
  
 The term “bigot” appears nowhere in the Supreme Court’s four landmark opinions 
affirming the constitutional liberty and equality of gay men and lesbians: Romer v. Evans, 
Lawrence v. Texas, United States v. Windsor, and Obergefell. 18 In Romer, however, Justice 
Scalia’s dissent charged Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as “verbally disparaging as bigotry” 
the “modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores” by 
passing a state constitutional amendment to bar “a politically powerful minority” (homosexuals) 
from “revis[ing] those mores through use of the laws.”19 What does it mean to “brand” someone 
as a bigot? 
 
 In Windsor and Obergefell, dissenters inferred a charge of bigotry from the majority’s 
analogies between now-repudiated racial and sex-based inequality in the institution of marriage 
and exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage. Justice Alito pictured a future in which religious 
believers who “cling” to the traditional understanding of marriage could “whisper their thoughts 
                                                 
general applicable criminal law). 
16 For further elaboration, see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, BIGOTRY, CONSCIENCE, AND MARRIAGE (forthcoming 
2019). 
17 See infra II.A.1 for references. 
18 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited any 
“protected status” based on “homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation,” violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking Texas law 
criminalizing consensual sodomy between two individuals “of the same sex” as violating constitutional “liberty” 
under the Due Process Clause of the  of the 14th Amendment ); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) 
(striking  portion of federal Defense of Marriage Act defining “marriage,” for purposes of all federal laws pertaining 
to marriage, as only between one man and one woman and operating to deny federal recognition of same-sex 
marriages valid under state laws as violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).; Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry as part of the 
“liberty” protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 




[only] in their recesses of their homes,” fearing that “if they repeat those views in public, they will 
risk being labeled [and treated] as bigots.”20 
 
 The dissents also contrasted bigotry with conscience and sincerity. In Obergefell, Chief 
Justice Roberts contended that the Court has “disparag[ed]” as “bigoted” the millions of Americans 
who, “as a matter of conscience, cannot accept same-sex marriage” or the Court’s “better informed 
understanding” of marriage.21 The passage in the Obergefell majority opinion that Roberts attacks 
warrants attention due to the central role it plays for both sides in post-Obergefell debates, 
including in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Justice Kennedy explained that constitutional rights – 
including the “right to marry” – arise not only from “history and tradition,” but also from “a better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that remains urgent in 
our own era.” 22Kennedy characterized opposition to same-sex marriage as based on “decent and 
honorable religious or philosophical premises,” but explained: “when that sincere, personal 
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the 
imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own 
liberty is then denied.”23 Kennedy later stated that the First Amendment protects the ability of 
opponents of same-sex marriage to teach and advocate their beliefs, but the state may not “bar 
same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as accorded to couples of the opposite sex.”24 
 
 Critics of expansive nondiscrimination laws enlist Kennedy’s opinion strategically to 
establish that believers seeking exemptions are not bigots; Obergefell promised that they would 
continue to be free to express their beliefs in the public square.25 Defenders of state 
nondiscrimination laws, in turn, enlist Obergefell’s language to assert that such exemptions would 
put the state’s “imprimatur” on religiously-motivated discrimination.26  
  
 II. Branding as A Bigot or Learning from the Past? 
 
 Is it instructive to relate prior assertions of religious liberty and conscience in the context 
of opposition to  laws barring discrimination on the basis of race to present-day assertions of 
religious liberty in the context of laws barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity? Or does drawing such analogies brand people as bigots? The PEACEFUL 
COEXISTENCE report (“Report”) released by the United States Civil Rights Commission 
(“Commission”) and Masterpiece Cakeshop litigation illustrate competing answers. 
  
A. The Civil Rights Commission’s PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Report 
 
 The Report’s “Findings and Recommendations” nowhere use the rhetoric of bigotry in 
                                                 
20Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
21Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
22Id. at 2602. 
23Id. at 2602. 
24Id. at 2607. 
25 See, e.g., Ryan Anderson, this volume. 




discussing the challenge of “reconciling nondiscrimination principles with civil liberties.” 
Nonetheless, individual commissioners made oblique references to “bigotry.” Parallels 
commissioners drew between religious justifications for racial segregation and the risks of religion 
– today – being used to justify “intolerance” and discrimination drew sharp criticism for “painting 
those who support religious freedom with the broad brush of bigotry.”27 Some critics, like legal 
scholar Richard Epstein, asserted that the label “bigotry” better fits the “intolerant” 
commissioners.28 
 
 1. Analogies to the Past 
 
 The “Findings” link discrimination based on sexual orientation to other forms of 
discrimination, cautioning: “Religious exemptions to the protections of civil rights based upon 
classifications such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability status, sexual orientation, and 
gender identity, when they are permissible, significantly infringe upon these civil rights.”29 The 
Report recommends narrow tailoring of “religious exceptions to civil liberties and civil rights” 
because “[o]verly-broad religious exemptions unduly burden nondiscrimination laws and 
policies.”30 
 
 Commission Chairman Martin R. Castro stated the following in connection with the  
Report’s release:  
 
The phrases “religious liberty” and “religious freedom” will stand for nothing 
except hypocrisy so long as they remain code words for discrimination, intolerance, 
racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, Christian supremacy or any form of 
intolerance.31 
 
Castro did not explicitly refer to “bigotry” in his statement. Still, “intolerance” and 
“discrimination” toward certain groups based on a group’s belief or shared characteristic are, on 
many dictionary definitions, synonymous with bigotry.32 
 
 Castro insisted that the present “generation of Americans” must learn from past appeals to 
“religious liberty” used to justify slavery and racism: 
 
[T]oday, as in the past, religion is being used as both a weapon and a shield by those 
seeking to deny others equality. In our nation’s past religion has been used to justify 
slavery and later, Jim Crow laws. We now see “religious liberty” arguments 
sneaking their way back into our political and constitutional discourses . . . in an 
effort to undermine the rights of some Americans. This generation of Americans 
                                                 
27USCCB Religious Liberty Chairman Responds, supra note 3. 
28Richard A. Epstein, The Government’s Civil Rights Bullies, DEFINING IDEAS (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/governments-civil-rights-bullies . 
29PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, supra note 8, at 25 (Finding 3). 
30Id. at 26 (Recommendation 1). 
31Chairman Martin R. Castro Statement, in PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, supra note 8, at 29. 




must stand up and speak out to ensure that religion never again be twisted to deny 
others the full promise of America.33 
 
 A Rebuttal by several commissioners (including Castro) also shares this premise that, 
without vigilance, religion may be distorted to deny the equality of others. This Rebuttal also 
makes the implicit explicit: it does refer to bigotry and questions “sincerity.” 34 The Rebuttal 
decries a “new wave of laws” being proposed “to limit the freedoms of [LGBT] people” and to 
allow public and private actors to discriminate against, including in commercial settings. The 
Rebuttal refers to Mississippi’s H.B. 1523 (the Protection of Conscience from Discrimination Act), 
North Carolina’s H.B. 2, and various “bathroom bills” requiring transgender persons to use public 
facilities corresponding to their sex at birth.35 This Rebuttal asserts (in a section title): “These laws 
and proposals represent an orchestrated, nationwide effort by extremists to promote bigotry, 
cloaked in the mantle of ‘religious freedom.”36  
  
 Critics of the Report viewed the findings and recommendations and the commissioners’ 
statements quoted above as tarring believers with the “brush” of bigotry. Commissioner Peter 
Kirsanow states that the “findings and recommendations lend credence to” Justice Alito’s 
warnings, detailed above.37 Kirsanow insisted that religious individuals “just want to be left alone” 
and not be forced by government – through nondiscrimination laws – to “associate” or to 
“speak.”38 
 
 In her statement and rebuttal, Commissioner Gail Heriot quotes the prediction by legal 
scholar Mary Ann Glendon, in 2004 after Massachusetts began allowing same-sex couples to 
marry, of a “new era of intolerance and discrimination,” in which “[e]very person and every 
religion that disagrees will be labeled as bigoted and openly discriminated against.”39 
 
 Critical reactions to the Report focus particularly on Chairman Castro’s statement.40 In a 
letter to President Obama, Senator Hatch, Representative Ryan, Archbishop Lori, and sixteen other 
“American faith leaders” expressed “deep concern” about the Report. Citing Castro’s statement, 
the letter demands that “no American citizen or institution be labeled by their government as 
bigoted because of their views and dismissed from the political life of our nation for holding those 
views.”41 
  
                                                 
33Castro Statement, supra note 31, at 29. 
34Commissioners Achtenberg, Castro, Kladney, Narasaki, and Yaki Rebuttal, in PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, 
supra note 8, at 155, 160.  
35 For critique of these laws, see Melling, this volume; Pizer, this volume; Wilson, this volume. 
36Id. at 160 (emphasis added).  
37Commissioner Peter Kirsanow Statement, in PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, supra note 8, at 42, 105. 
38Id. at 123. 
39Mary Ann Glendon, For Better for Worse, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 25, 2004) (quoted in Commissioner Gail 
Heriot Statement and Rebuttal, in PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, supra note 8, at 151 n. 52).  
40Nicholas Senz, Obama Administration Says You’re a Bigot if You Live Your Religion, FEDERALIST (Sep. 
19, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/09/obama-administration-says-youre-bigot-live-religion. 
41Letter from Most Reverend William E. Lori and others to President Obama, Hon. Orrin G. Hatch, and 




 2. Flipping the Charges of Bigotry and Intolerance 
 
 Some critics of the Report not only reject its implicit or explicit charge that opponents of   
nondiscrimination laws protecting LGBT people  are bigots; they flip the charges of bigotry. 
Epstein insists that business owners who seek to live – and do business – according to their 
religious beliefs and are willing generally to serve gay and lesbian customers are not bigots. When 
they decline to violate their beliefs by helping to celebrate a same-sex marriage, they “bear[] no 
relationship to a ‘prejudiced or close-minded person, especially one who is intolerant or hostile 
towards different social groups.’”42 By comparison: 
 
[T]he words “bigotry” and “phobia” clearly do apply to the five commissioners 
who happily denounce people like Stutzman [a florist who declined to arrange 
flowers for a gay customer’s wedding] . . . . They show no tolerance, let alone 
respect, for people with whom they disagree. . . . They show deep prejudice and 
hostility to all people of faith.43 
 
 Simply to point out the appeal to religion in justifying prior forms of discrimination, as 
Castro does, is not to argue that religious beliefs equal bigotry. That said, there are better ways to 
express this point than Castro’s rhetoric of pretext and weaponizing religion, as some of the 
arguments made in Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrate. 
 
B. Masterpiece Cakeshop 
  
 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Supreme Court will decide the appeal of the self-described 
“cake artist” Jack Phillips, who asks the Court to decide “whether applying Colorado’s public 
accommodations law to compel artists to create expression that violates their sincerely held 
religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment.”44 Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, appeals a decision by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals that he violated the public accommodations provision of the Colorado 
Antidiscrimination Act (“CADA”) when, citing his religious beliefs, he declined to bake a cake 
for a celebration of Charlie Craig and David Mullins’ wedding ceremony. The Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed a prior decision by the  Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which upheld an 
administrative law judge’s decision that Phillips violated CADA and that denying him an 
exemption did not violate his First Amendment rights.45 
 
 The rhetoric of bigotry and conscience has been deployed in this litigation by both sides to 
analogize between past and present civil rights battles. This Section first examines arguments made 
by Phillips and his amici, then considers arguments made by respondents Colorado Civil Rights 
                                                 
42 Epstein, supra note 28 (using Wikipedia’s definitions). 
43Id. 
44Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop et al. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission et al., No. 16-
111, at I. 
45 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 370 P.3d 272 (Col. Ct. App. 2015), cert denied sub nom Masterpiece 




Commission (“CCRC”), Craig and Mullins, and their amici. On each side, only a minority of the 
amicus briefs explicitly use the rhetoric of bigotry—14 of those filed in support of Phillips; 9 of 
those filed in support of respondents. 46 It is instructive to examine the usage of that term.  
 
1. Arguments by Phillips and His Amici 
 
 Phillips and his amici contend that compelling him to “design” a “custom” wedding cake 
for a same-sex couple unconstitutionally forces him to “celebrate same-sex marriage,” which he 
“in good conscience” cannot do, since he “seeks to live his life, pursue his profession, and craft 
his art consistently with his religious identity.”47 Phillips argues Colorado violated the First 
Amendment by compelling a private citizen “‘to utter what is not in his mind.’”48 In support, 
Phillips invokes the famous compulsory flag salute case, West Virginia v. Barnette.49 
 
 These briefs also quote from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell and argue 
that a ruling against Phillips would fail to realize Obergefell’s “laudable effort to promote tolerance 
and mutual respect in a pluralistic national community.”50 Unless the Supreme Court reverses, the 
amici contend, it will send a message that Phillips is a bigot, a pariah, properly excluded from the 
public square – contrary to Obergefell’s “promise” to conscientious dissenters about their First 
Amendment rights. The path to peaceful coexistence lies in exemptions in case of such “decent 
and honorable” beliefs, so that people of faith are not driven from public life.51 Their dignitary and 
other interests are  harmed far more than those of a would-be customer denied service in the current 
gay-friendly marketplace.52 
 
a. Showing “Hostility” Toward Phillips’s Religion 
 
 Phillips and several of his amici assert that the CCRC and the Colorado appellate court 
showed “hostility” toward his religion. They cite this remark made by a commissioner in 
proceedings before the CCRC:  
 
 Freedom of religion and religion have been used to justify all kinds of 
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the 
[H]olocaust, . . . we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has 
been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces 
of rhetoric that people . . . use their religion to hurt others.53 
                                                 
46 This count reflects electronic searches of the briefs for “bigot,” “bigoted,” and “bigotry.” 
47Brief for Petitioners, supra note 44, at 14-17.  
48Id. at 2. 
49Id. at 3, 15 (citing W. Va. Bd. v.  Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). This chapter focuses more on Phillips’s 
Free Exercise claim than his compelled expression/speech claim. 
50Brief of Amici Curiae 34 Legal Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop et al. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission et al., No. 16-111, at 14-17, at 27. All the amicus briefs from this litigation are 
available at: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/masterpiece-cakeshop-ltd-v-colorado-civil-rights-commn/. 
51 For similar views in this volume, see Ryan Anderson. 
52 For other weighing of burdens, see Laycock, this volume. 





Amici Liberty Counsel argues this remark illustrates that CCRC has “fully embraced [the idea] 
that religious beliefs must take a back seat to eliminating what it views as discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, because religious freedom is just an excuse to justify hurting other people.”54 
Phillips argues that the CCRC’s “disdain” for his “religious views” is also evident from its 
permitting three other bakers to decline to create cakes with “offensive” messages expressing 
disapproval of same-sex marriage.55 Amici William Jack, who requested those three cakes, 
contends that the CCRC “expressed hostility towards [his] traditional religious views” as being 
“odious.”56  
 
 It bears noting that, in affirming the CCRC’s ruling against Phillips, the Colorado Court of 
Appeals neither denied the “sincerity” of Phillips’s religious beliefs about marriage nor called him 
a “bigot.” The court did, however, draw on precedents rejecting religious defenses to public 
accommodations laws to explain that the freedom to act on religious beliefs has limits. It cited 
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, a 1966 case in which the federal district court in South 
Carolina refused “to lend credence or support to [the restaurant owner’s] position that he has a 
constitutional right to refuse to serve members of the Negro race in his business establishment 
upon the ground that to do so would violate his sacred religious beliefs.” 57 Quoting Piggie Park, 
the Colorado court explained that, while free exercise includes a “‘right to espouse beliefs of 
[one’s] own choosing,’” it does not include “‘the absolute right to exercise and practice such beliefs 
in utter disregard of the clear constitutional rights of other citizens.’”58 So, too, the court reasoned, 
if Masterpiece Cakeshop wishes to operate as a “public accommodation” and “conduct business” 
in Colorado, CADA “prohibits it from picking and choosing customers based on their sexual 
orientation.”59 
 
 In concluding that CADA, a neutral law of general applicability, was constitutional, the 
court related the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of states’  “compelling” interest in 
eliminating discrimination on the basis of race and sex in places of public accommodation to 
Colorado’s interest in eliminating discrimination in such places on the basis of sexual orientation. 
It concluded that CADA “creates a hospitable environment for all consumers,” which “prevents 
the economic and social balkanization prevalent when businesses decide to serve only their own 
‘kind.’”60 
  
b. Merchants of “Good Conscience” are not Bigots 
 
 Phillips and his amici contrast the religious believer with “decent and honorable” beliefs 
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about marriage with the racist and the homophobe. Phillips, “a conscientious man of faith,” “gladly 
serves people from all walks of life, including individuals of all races, faiths, and sexual 
orientations,” but simply “declines all requests . . . to create custom artistic expression that conflicts 
with his faith.”61 This  conscience-driven refusal to express a message, in this instance “celebrating 
same-sex marriage,” one amicus argues, is not the “invidious discrimination” like that at the core 
of laws banning discrimination in public accommodations; in those instances, “a merchant objects 
to serving some people just because and on the ground that they are black, or female . . . or gay.” 62 
 
A number of amici enlist the rhetoric of bigotry in urging the Supreme Court to reverse. In 
arguing that Phillips has been “branded” a bigot, some remind the Court of the prediction in Justice 
Alito’s Obergefell dissent: “Colorado has unquestionably labeled and treated Petitioner as a 
bigot.”63 The amicus curiae brief filed by Sherif Girgis and Robert George suggests that denying 
Phillips’s claim will “tell him – and all traditional Muslims, Orthodox Jews, and Christians – that 
acting on beliefs central to his identity is wrong, benighted, even bigoted;” Obergefell “expressly” 
rejects sending such a message.64 Asserting that Craig and Mullins “suffered no material harm” 
from Phillips’ refusal, another amicus curiae brief emphasizes the harms suffered by Phillips: “the 
State has effectively branded him a bigot and rendered him something of an outcast, seriously 
harming his reputation in the community.”65 
 
c. Rejecting Analogies to Past Civil Rights Struggles  
 
Amici for Phillips argue that past civil rights struggles are not relevant to Phillips’ refusal 
of service to Craig and Mullins: “Public-accommodations concerns of past eras are not present 
here.”66 One reason is that “the artist plainly did not act out of invidious discrimination” but instead 
out of concern not to “violate [his] conscience.” 67Another is the distinction between genuine 
public accommodations, “like restaurants and hotels,” and “customized pieces of art,”  like 
wedding cakes. 68 A third is that Craig and Mullins “had immediate access to other artists,”69 unlike 
discriminated-against minorities under the Jim Crow practices that Title II sought to end. Some 
amici treat Title II as the paradigm of a narrowly-tailored public accommodations law, contrasting 
CADA as an inappropriate expansion of nondiscrimination law that, instead of remedying 
discrimination, now is a “source” of it.70 Such expansion has led, as Chief Justice Rehnquist 
predicted in Dale above, to clashes with First Amendment rights.  
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 Other amici concede the general legitimacy of including “sexual orientation” protections 
in nondiscrimination law, but argue that goods and services related to same-sex weddings are a 
special case. One brief asserts that Phillips simply refuses to “use his artistic gifts to provide a 
particular service” because he believes it “contrary to God’s law and biblical teachings.”71 
Notably, the amicus brief filed by Utah Republican State Senators argues that, “in Republican-
controlled ‘red’ states, the lack of protections for LGBT [sic] in places of public accommodations 
leave them exposed to potential abuses most Americans would find deplorable.” 72  But red states 
like Utah, they argue, have not extended their public accommodations law to include “sexual 
orientation”  out of concern that such laws might not adequately protect the First Amendment 
rights of “conscientious objectors” like Phillips.73  
 
d. Downplaying the Role of Religion in Past Defenses of Racism and 
Discrimination 
  
 Some amici reject any comparison between Phillips’s “decent and honorable” beliefs about 
marriage and religious justifications for segregation and anti-miscegenation laws. For example, in 
his brief, Ryan T. Anderson of the Heritage Foundation (who is also writing for this volume) 
contrasts opposition to interracial marriage, rooted in “racist bigotry,” with support for marriage 
as a “conjugal union of husband and wife,” rooted in “decent and honorable premises.” 74 
To rule for Phillips would send “no message about the supposed inferiority of people who identify 
as gay,” but instead a message “that citizens who support the historic understanding of marriage 
are not bigots and that the state may not drive them out of business and civic life.” 75 
 
 Anderson downplays the pervasiveness and sincerity of religious rationales marshaled in 
the past for racial segregation and against interracial marriage: the “wicked system of white 
supremacy” was rooted in “bigotry,” “animus,” and convictions about racial hierarchy. For 
Anderson, political leaders’ appeal to theology to justify racial “subordination” showed how 
religion “was perverted to justify racism and slavery.”76 Missing is recognition that white 
segregationists vehemently denied charges of bigotry and insisted they were waging a war of 
morality and conscience, with God on their side.77 The “the theology of segregation” sounded in 
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pulpits and pages of the Congressional Record.78 Further, even some who came to oppose legal 
segregation believed that there were “decent and honorable” grounds for opposing interracial 
marriage. In 1963, when asked whether racial integration would lead to “inter-marriage,” President 
Harry Truman, who issued an executive order initiating the desegregation of the military and 
created the President’s Commission on Civil Rights, answered: “I hope not. I don’t believe in it. 
The Lord created it that way. You read your Bible and you’ll find out.”79 
 
e. The Demands of Tolerance 
 
Some amici assert that Colorado has been intolerant toward Phillips and his sincere 
religious beliefs. Thus, Epstein repeats the charges of intolerance he sounded against 
Commissioners on the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, decrying “state coercion” against “the few 
vulnerable family firms” – like Masterpiece – that raise conscience-based objections;” the brief 
asserts that Phillips “and others like him have repeatedly been victimized by such actions.”80 
Another brief asserts that “secular ideologies increasingly employ the strong arm of the state to 
advance their causes, promoting tolerance and respect for some while ruthlessly suppressing 
others,” forgetting that “tolerance is a two-way street.”81 This argument that Colorado was 
intolerant toward Phillips prefigures Justice Kennedy’s chiding of Colorado at oral argument that 
“tolerance is most meaningful when it’s mutual;” Colorado, Kennedy asserted, “has been neither 
tolerant nor respectful of Mr. Phillips’ religious beliefs.”82 
 
2. Arguments by Respondents and their Amici 
 
Of the forty-six amicus briefs filed on behalf of respondents CCRC and Craig and Mullins, 
only nine explicitly use the terms “bigot,” bigoted,” or “bigotry,” and just six do so in their 
argument.83 None explicitly labels Phillips a bigot. Do they, nonetheless, imply that he is one? 
This Section examines some of those briefs, using one as a doorway into examining an argument 
that some commentators view as labeling religious persons as bigots: “we have heard this before 
and should learn the lessons of history.” Many amici argue that the long history of asserting a 
variety of First Amendment justifications for racial and sex discrimination – and of courts 
eventually rejecting such justifications – affords reasons for courts to reject present-day religious 
and other justifications for sexual orientation discrimination in the context of marriage, or,  more 
broadly, for LGBT discrimination. The same “principles” that underlie landmark federal public 
accommodations laws apply to the expansion of state laws to include sexual orientation (and, some 
amici add, gender identity). They warn that recognizing exemptions based on conscience or 
religious beliefs threatens to reverse hard-won progress in protecting civil rights and may put the 
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state’s “imprimatur” on discrimination. 
 
a. Do Amici Brand Phillips as a Bigot? 
 
The amicus brief filed by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund et al. refers to 
bigotry not in marketplace discrimination but in violence against LGBT persons:  
 
Because anti-LGBT discrimination is pervasive and results in fears that hostility may lurk 
behind any counter or storefront, this community has created “safe spaces,” in which to relax 
and let down their guard. . .. Tragically, as the violent Pulse nightclub massacre in Florida last 
year shows, even in such safe spaces members of the LGBT community may be targets of life-
shattering, even life-ending bigotry. 84 
 
Putting the stamp of governmental approval on discrimination has “dangerous repercussions,” 
including more discrimination and an increased risk of anti-LGBT violence. The brief mirrors the 
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE Report in defending Colorado’s nondiscrimination law’s choice of “a 
path of peaceful coexistence and equal access in public life.”85 The brief does not question the 
sincerity of Phillips’ religious belief, but explains the “dangerous ripple effects” of recognizing 
religious or creative expression exemptions to nondiscrimination laws. Enlisting Obergefell, the 
brief cautions: “When even ‘sincere, personal opposition’ to treating LGBT people equally 
‘becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the 
State itself on exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then 
denied.’”86 
 
A second brief does not explicitly call Phillips a bigot, but observes that Loving and Bob Jones 
University illustrate that “much prejudice against people of different races in the United States was 
justified on religious grounds, and racists often still base their bigotry on their religious faith.”87 
The brief warns that precedents like Bob Jones might be at risk if the Court allows “religious 
preferences and beliefs” to be sufficient to exempt Phillips from CADA. The brief counters 
Phillips’s theory that Craig and Mullins suffered minimal harm, being denied service at a 
particular business: “The true harm comes from being the victim of bigotry, and not necessarily 
that from the inconvenience of seeking alternative providers.”88 
 
 A third brief states: “CADA forbids discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation – 
whether motivated by pure bigotry, secular morality, or religious belief.” 89 The brief presents 
Phillips’s free exercise claim as a “sympathetic case,” posing a dilemma of “conscience.” 
Nonetheless, invoking Smith, it warns that there is no principled limit to the conscience exemption 
Phillips seeks, anticipating numerous clashes between “commands of conscience” and laws “that 
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protect fundamental rights, equal protection, health and safety, free markets, or other social 
goods.”90  
 
A fourth brief that mentions “bigotry,” filed by the Central Conference of Rabbis, rejects 
the oppositional framing of “religious liberty versus LGBT rights,” pointing to “broad religious 
support for LGBT nondiscrimination.”91 The explicit reference to bigotry occurs when the brief 
recounts some religious leaders’ opposition to Mississippi’s HB 1523: “Rabbi Jeffrey Simons 
perceived [HB 1523] as being ‘not about religion . . . [but] about bigotry.’” 92  
 
Another brief critiques the claim by Phillips and his supporters that people of faith are 
being branded as bigots when public accommodations laws are applied to them: “Opponents 
contend that they are the victims of secularism – positioned as bigots and pariahs – then leverage 
that narrative to assert that they are not bigots at all because they are not discriminating based on 
sexual orientation. Instead, they are making a choice to reject conduct – marriage.”93 The brief 
positions this attempt to distinguish between identity (status) and conduct (marriage) in a longer 
history of opposing “civil rights gains for the LGBT community.” Notably, this brief does not rely 
on analogies to racial discrimination, but charts the shifting rationales offered to oppose civil rights 
for LGBT people, interlacing the Court’s own trajectory from Bowers v. Hardwick to Obergefell 
and its rejection of the status-conduct distinction.94  
 
b. Learning From the Past  
 
  The amicus brief filed by Massachusetts, along with eighteen other states and the District 
of Columbia, illustrates a theme in many briefs filed in support of upholding Colorado’s law: : 
“history has taught us to be wary” of the assertion of Free Exercise claims to justify “refus[ing] 
equal service to certain members of the public based on its owner’s personal beliefs.”95 Public 
accommodations laws are “a centerpiece of state efforts to combat the economic, personal, and 
social harms caused by invidious discrimination,” including that experienced by LGBTQ people.96  
 
 The argument that “we have heard this kind of claim before”97 draws directs analogies 
between the role of religious beliefs to justify racial and sexual orientation discrimination. In 
Piggie Park, the brief observes, the Supreme Court characterized as “patently frivolous” the 
business owner’s assertion of a constitutional right not to violate his “sacred religious beliefs” 
about segregation as the reason for his “refusal to serve members of the Negro race.”98 It then 
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asserts: “Businesses today have no more of a right to justify their discrimination against LGBTQ 
individuals on religious grounds.”  
 
Motive for discrimination, the brief insists, does not matter. Thus, to Phillips’ question 
“whether the States’ compelling interest in combatting discrimination extends to discrimination 
motivated by ‘sincerely held religious beliefs,” the brief insists “the answer is a resounding 
‘yes.’”99  
 
 The Massachusetts brief’s single reference to “bigotry” appears in the context of citing the 
recent violence in Charlottesville and the sizable minority of the public who disapprove of 
interracial marriage: 
 
It remains a sad fact of American society that bigoted beliefs are disturbingly prevalent. Under 
Petitioners’ theory, an anti-Semitic baker could refuse to sell a wedding cake to a Jewish couple 
because he does not wish ‘to create expression that he considers objectionable.’ . . . And a 
racist architect could refuse to design a family home for an interracial couple on the same 
grounds.100  
 
While the First Amendment “tolerates all manner of odious speech in the public square,” the brief 
adds, it does not insulate businesses from liability for such refusals.101 
 
 The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund also sounds the theme of learning from 
history, relating the denial of service to three would-be customers in 2012 – Mr. Mullins, Mr. 
Craig, and Mr. Craig’s mother –  to the denial of service at a barbeque to three African-American 
customers in 1964 – leading to Piggie Park.102 The brief observes that, at the time of the Court’s 
decision, the restaurant owner’s “religious beliefs were relatively mainstream.” He was not viewed 
as “fringe or disingenuous,” making the Court’s ruling all the more significant.103    
 
 This brief highlights the appeal to religious beliefs to justify now-repudiated forms of 
discrimination, emphasizing that such beliefs were not isolated, marginal positions, but sincerely 
and widely held and articulated. “[T]he overarching lesson of Piggie Park, Bob Jones, and Loving 
is that this Court has repeatedly and unambiguously rejected religious-based justifications for 
differential treatment . . . for good reasons: the government has a compelling interest in combating 
discrimination in its various forms.”104 Amicus American Bar Association adds that  such “historic 
decisions” as Piggie Park and Bob Jones contributed to the eventual emergence of a “settled social 
consensus” despite the many “passionate” and “sincere” moral and religious objections to Title II:  
“business owners who offer their goods and service to the public cannot claim constitutional 
                                                 
99 Brief of Massachusetts et al., supra note 96, at 21. 
100 Id. at 32. 
101 Id. 
102 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, at 
2-3. 
103 Id. at 14 (citing media coverage of Mr. Bessinger). 




sanctuary from public accommodations laws.”105 
 
 At the Masterpiece Cakeshop oral argument, the liberal justices brought up Piggie Park, 
along with other civil rights era cases, in questioning petitioners’ First Amendment claims.106 They 
expressed concern that an exemption could undermine the entire structure of nondiscrimination 
laws.107 On the other hand, after observing that “the racial analogy obviously is very compelling,” 
Chief Justice Roberts pointed out that Obergefell “went out of its way to talk about the decent and 
honorable people who may have opposing views.” 108 Phillips, on this reading of Obergefell, is 
morally distinct from a racist.  Whether this distinction is enough to justify exempting him from 
Colorado’s laws remains to be seen. 
 
 III. Conclusion  
 
 Charges of “branding as a bigot” often stem from analogies between past and present forms 
of exclusion and injustice. These charges are often needless and provocative. The mere step of 
drawing analogies between past and present forms of discrimination to point out how, over time, 
new insights and evolving understandings lead to recognition that such treatment lacks justification 
is not a charge of “bigotry.” Nor should a charge of bigotry be inferred simply from explanations 
about the constitutional limits of using religious and moral beliefs as a basis for (1) excluding 
others from a constitutional right (such as the fundamental right to marry) or (2) denying them the 
protection of civil rights laws. On the other hand, it is needlessly provocative to indict religious 
beliefs as a “pretext” or “code word” for discrimination in order to explain that there must be limits 
to acting on such beliefs – however sincere – in the marketplace. The better path, modeled by 
Justice Bosson’s concurring opinion in Elane Photography, is to speak in terms of the requirements 
of civility and tolerance, or the “price of citizenship” in a pluralistic society.109  Bosson attempted 
to address the business owners “with utmost respect,” while explaining that their freedom to live 
out their religious beliefs “wherever they lead” in their personal lives must have some limits in 
“our civic life,” including public accommodations. He focuses on the strength of the state’s interest 
in the terms of that civic life to show the force of analogy: “the [state] legislature has made it clear 
that to discriminate in business on the basis of sexual orientation is just as intolerable as 
discrimination directed toward race, color, national origin, or religion.” 110 
 
 What will the Supreme Court say about whether this “price of citizenship” is too high? It 
is always difficult to read tea leaves predicting the outcome in closely-watched cases, but the oral 
argument suggested that concern for “tolerance and mutual respect” may prove key to Justice 
Kennedy, widely believed to be the crucial fifth vote for the majority. Kennedy appeared troubled 
both by Phillips’s efforts to draw lines to carve out an exception from state nondiscrimination laws 
for “compelled expression” and by a lack of tolerance and respect shown by the Commission 
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toward Phillips’s religion. Kennedy focused on whether the comment of one of the commissioners, 
discussed above, expressed “hostility” toward Phillips’ religion. Kennedy chided counsel for the 
CCRC for its treatment of Phillips, admonishing that “tolerance is essential in a free society” and 
should be “mutual.”111 Kennedy also seemed sympathetic to the argument that public 
accommodations laws like CADA could exempt merchants like Phillips, so long as a gay couple 
could readily find the same good or service elsewhere. Even so, he expressed concern that a ruling 
for Phillips could allow a “boycott” of “gay marriage” and be “an affront to the gay community.”112 
Perhaps the Court may avoid  ruling on the merits, given the many quagmires about finding any 
line that would not undermine nondiscrimination law – not to mention its own precedents 
(including Obergefell). It might, for example, remand to afford the Commission (minus the 
“hostile”  Commissioner) or the Colorado legislature a chance to craft some kind of exemption 
that would not be an “affront” to would-be customers like Craig and Mullins, but also show (in 
Kennedy’s words) more tolerance and respect toward Phillips. If nothing else, the Masterpiece 
litigation shows the many constitutional and political commitments at stake and the importance 
from learning from the past as states attempt to protect against discrimination, based on evolving 
insights and understandings. The path forward from Obergefell to a more tolerant and respectful 
society is being charted by the Court, federal and state lawmakers, civil rights advocates, and  
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